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Abstract: In the context of a Competitive Ricardian Model (CRM), one can ask whether it is possible 
to relate winners and losers from a CU based on comparative advantage considerations. This was 
pursued by Venables (2003), who showed that careful consideration of a country’s comparative 
advantage – with the rest of the world relative to that with its partners in the CU- yields predictions 
about winners and losers. Starting from initial tariff equilibrium, in a 3 country model with a 
continuum of goods, he shows that a country with ‘extreme’ comparative advantage will be more 
vulnerable to trade diversion. In this experiment, the 3 x 3 Competitive Ricardian Model (CRM) in two 
scenarios multiple import tariffs and a customs union. We fully characterise the equilibrium under 
both. Starting from a tariff distorted situation, we find that when a customs union is formed there is 
an increase in trade flows among members; a rise in individual consumption of some goods; a clear 
terms of trade effect and the existence of trade diversion. Our experimental results support the 
simulation findings of Venables (2003), who showed that countries which have ‘extreme’ 
comparative advantage in a customs union will generally be more vulnerable to trade diversion.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The growing literature in experimental economics shows that market convergence generalise to a 
wide class of experimental economies, including those with multiple markets, small as well as large 
numbers of traders, robot traders or human traders, and markets with externalities. Although 
experimental economies converge towards equilibrium predictions, this process is not immediate. 
Convergence is achieved through a dynamic process that leads the variables in the economy towards 
equilibrium values. As experimental economies become more complex, the attainment of equilibrium 
becomes slower and less comprehensive. However, the equilibration process interacts with the 
specific interdependencies in different microeconomic structures to produce consistent and 
replicable results. There are many authors who have studied different complex environments 
including market interdependencies. Examples include Goodfellow and Plott (1990), who include 
production with derived demand; Chen and Plott (2002), who induced an exchange economy with 
two or more commodities; Lian and Plott (1998) who induced a small general equilibrium system 
with a circular flow of income; Noussair et al (2007) who created a large experimental environment 
to represent 3 countries trading in a perfectly competitive world; and Noussair and Powell (2008), 
Noussair and Powell (2008) who constructed experimental markets to observe behaviour of assets 
markets that experience a peak or trough in fundamentals.  
 
There are few experiments who addressed international trade issues. Noussair et al (1995) tried to 
answer questions related to the law of comparative advantage, factor price equalisation, terms of 
trade, efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the 
effects of tariffs on international transactions. Engelman and Normann (2003) analysed the model of 
strategic trade policy proposed by Brander and Spencer (1985). They created a Cournot duopoly 
framework, matching the requirements of the Brander and Spencer (1985) theory. Nowbutsing 
(2011) analyse the fragility of the law of the comparative advantage in higher dimensions in an 
experimental laboratory. 
 
Viner (1950) famously argued that it is the relative strength of trade creation and trade diversion 
which determines whether or not a customs union (CU) will be beneficial or harmful. The former 
involves a shift in domestic consumption from a high-cost domestic source to a lower-cost partner 
source; the latter a shift from a low-cost domestic source to a higher-cost partner source. In the 
context of a Competitive Ricardian Model (CRM), one can ask whether it is possible to relate winners 
and losers from a CU based on comparative advantage considerations. This was pursued by Venables 
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(2003), who showed that careful consideration of a country’s comparative advantage – with the rest 
of the world relative to that with its partners in the CU- yields predictions about winners and losers. 
Starting from initial tariff equilibrium, in a 3 country model with a continuum of goods, he shows that 
a country with ‘extreme’ comparative advantage will be more vulnerable to trade diversion.  
 
In this paper, the  3 x 3 CRM is explored in two scenarios:  the existence of multiple import tariffs and 
formation of a customs union. Under the tariff distorted (TD) situation, each country imposes tariffs 
on its imports whereas in the customs union, two countries abolish import tariffs between 
themselves, while imposing a Common External Tariff (CET) on non-member countries. Clear-cut 
predictions about production, consumption, net exports and the terms of trade are made. The 
experiment features three countries which differ in their level of endowment and production 
technologies, three output goods and one factor. The laboratory environment allows the 
investigatation of several issues. First, does the theoretical model predict the outcome well when the 
formation of a custom union is allowed? Second, is there the existence of trade diversion? Third, does 
an extreme comparative advantage country lose from union membership?  Starting from a tariff 
distorted situation, it is found that when a customs union is formed there is an increase in trade flows 
among members; a rise in individual consumption of some goods; a clear terms of trade effect and 
trade diversion. Therefore, the experimental results support the simulation findings of Venables 
(2003).   
 
This research adds to the experimental trade literature in two ways. First, this is the first attempt to 
model customs union formation in a laboratory setting. Second, although much has been written on 
welfare comparisons of tariff- distorted and customs union equilibria in analytical and empirical 
models, this is the first attempt to address this using laboratory generated data. The remainder of the 
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental parameters. Section 3 presents 
the theoretical predictions of the TD and CU models. Section 4 describes the statistical methodology. 
The results are reported in Section 5. The conclusion is presented in section 6.    
  
2. Experimental Design 
 
Parameters: A generalized CRM with three countries and three goods motivates our environment. 
Trade in all markets followed the continuous double auction rules that were implemented through 
the MUDA software, details of which are available in Plott (1991) and Plott and Gray (1990). Table 1 
shows the experimental parameters. We assume that continuous approximation of the utility 
functions of both consumers and producers are quadratic and additively separable1. The idea of 
separability is of fundamental importance. If utility is directly additive, then the marginal utility of 
any good varies with the quantity of that good alone. This representation of utility is also consistent 
with the goods being normal. In addition, given any income, the ratio of the income elasticity to its 
price elasticity is taken to be constant. In our case, it also makes it easy to determine redemption 
values of consumers. Each country has an equal number of producers and consumers and is endowed 
with a given amount of labour. Countries differ in their level of endowment and production 
technologies. Total endowment in each country is four times the amount listed in the table.   
 
There are two types of agents/traders in each country: C and P. Furthermore agents are divided 
equally among countries (6 each) and each has an equal number of Type C and P (3 each). Labour (L)  
is immobile between countries, whereas X, Y and Z can be traded wherever they are produced.  The 
market system works as follows: Type C agents are owners of L and have induced preferences for 
consuming X, Y and Z. So they sell L to Type P agents in their respective country and buy units of X, Y 
and Z from any countries. P agents are also endowed with L (a smaller amount compared to C 
traders) and buy L from C in their own countries. They use it to produce X, Y and Z, according to their 
respective production schedule, which they sell to consumers in all three countries. C traders gain 
utility from consumption of goods X, Y and Z and from profits made in market activities and 
speculation. Any units of X, Y and Z bought are assumed to be consumed. P traders gain utility from 
                                                        
1 Assume that U (a) is well behaved if it is defined, strictly monotonic, and twice continuously 
differentiable on the nonnegative orthant a 0. Then, U (a) is additively separable if it can be written as  
2        ),(),.....()( 1 TxfaaUaU ttT   in an appropriate normalization. 
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trading and speculation. Any units of L not used to produce goods are worthless. Similarly any unit of 
X, Y and Z that is not sold is valueless to them. All market activities are denoted in an experimental 
currency “franc”. 
 
Table 1: Experimental Parameters 
 
The Tariff-Distorted Environment:  When Countries 2 and 3 impose a tariff of 320 francs on 
imports of good X; countries 1 and 3 impose a tariff of 240 on imports of Y; countries 1 and 2 impose 
a tariff of 340 francs on imports of Z.   Tariff revenue was not redistributed to but retained by the 
experimenter. As such, the tariff operated like a transport cost.     
 
The Customs Union Environment: Here, countries 1 and 2 abolish tariffs on trade and impose a CET 
on imports of Z from country 3, which imposes a tariff on imports of X and Y.  Countries 1 and 2 
impose a tariff of 340 francs on the imports of Z; country 3 one of 240 on imports of Y and a tariff of 
320 francs on the imports of X.                    
                                         
The upper part of Figure 1 shows the circular flow in country 2, the lower left and lower right circular 
flows of countries 1 and 3 respectively. There are 12 markets in operation in the experiment. Each 
variable has its own market: Outputs Xi, Yi and Zi produced in country i have their own markets (i = 1, 
2, 3). Labour, Li, in each country has its own market. Trade occurs when goods are sold to agents in 
countries where production did not take place. The dotted arrows show the various tariffs imposed.  
 
Procedures: Eight experiments with a subject pool of 18 (6 in each country) were conducted.2 
Experiments 1- 4 relate to the TD and 5- 8 to the CU environment. Subjects had an hour practice 
session in the use of MUDA before the experiment (for which they were paid) and were not allowed 
to participate in more than one experiment. Each experiment was divided into 5 periods of 10 
minutes. Once assembled subjects were randomly assigned as Type C or P agents and kept the same 
role. Instructions were given to both with information on: subject’s type and number of goods in the 
computerized market; endowment and cash on hand; operation of the market system; the production 
schedule and redemption values; trading profits, earnings and market restrictions (which included 
information about taxes). Full details of these are given in Appendices 2 and 3. Basic information 
about MUDA included how to buy/ sell units, what numbers in the boxes meant and transformation 
functions. In the practice period accounting records were checked carefully for errors and subjects 
reminded of the production and consumption process. In later periods spot checks were undertaken 
to verify accounting information. Subjects were also asked to check changes in cash on hand, 
endowments and contract history. The redemption values and production schedule were the same 
for each period; subjects received new endowments and cash on hand at the beginning of each 
period. 
                                                        
2 Subjects were undergraduates from the University of Nottingham. Most were non-economics students. 
Preferences:  Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 
U (X, Y, Z) = 600X- 45 X2 + 720Y- 45Y2 + 840Z- 45Z2   
Endowments of input factor (L):     
Consumers   2 3 4 
Producers   1 1 1 
Number:      
Consumers   3 3 3 
Producers   3 3 3 
Total Endowment  9 12 15 
Production   X=4L X=L X=L 
   Y=L Y=3L Y=2L 
   Z=L Z=2L Z=3L 
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Figure 1: The Market System  
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3. Theoretical Predictions 
 
Predictions about two environments are made namely the tariff- distorted environment and customs 
union environment.  
 
Tariff –Distorted Environment: The 3 x 3 CRM consists of 3 countries (i = 1, 2, 3), 3 output goods (j = X, 
Y, Z) and an input factor (L). The outputs can be produced using the same input, paralleling the CRM of 
trade theory. Countries differ in their level of endowment (L) which is supplied inelastically. Countries 
also differ in their production technologies. From Table 1, the constant labour costs of producing a unit of 
good j in country i are:                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each country produces and exports the good in which it has comparative advantage and imports the 
other two. The production technologies satisfy Jones (1961) optimum efficient assignment of production 
when countries 1, 2 and 3 specialise in goods X, Y and Z respectively.  Countries have identical aggregate 
demand for all three goods. 
 
When a tariff is in place, it takes the form of T on the goods in which country i has comparative advantage. 
Each country determines its own tariffs by maximising the tariff distorted utility function. Starting from 
free trade, the introduction of the tariff creates a price wedge and shifts consumption from the importing 
countries to the exporting country. The introduction of tariffs does not disturb production as supplies of 
goods are inelastic. 
 
The theoretical predictions are derived in the following way. Total endowments give us production levels 
of X, Y and Z in each country. Free trade aggregate demand in each and total aggregate demand are 
computed from the utility function, from which free trade prices are derived. The tariff causes a price 
wedge between the exporting and importing prices, giving the new tariff distorted demand in each; from 
which new quantity demanded is obtained. The next step involves substituting tariff distorted demand 
into the utility functions which are differentiated to derive import tariffs. Using these figures, prices of 
each good, net exports and terms of trade are derived3.  
 
Table 2: Tariff-Distorted Predictions   
Variables Country 1  Country 2 Country 3  
Production        
X 36 - - 
Y  - 36 - 
Z - - 45 
Export        
X 13.33 - - 
Y  - 16 - 
Z - - 18.66 
Prices        
X 80 - - 
Y  - 240 - 
Z - - 220 
L  320 720 660 
                                                        
3 The computation and description of the tariff distorted are in a technical Appendix available from the authors.  
  Country 
  1 2 3 
 X 1/4 1 2 
Good  Y  1 1/3 1/2 
 Z 1 1/2 1/3 
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Tariffs        
TX   - 320 320 
TY   240 - 240 
TZ    340 340 - 
Terms of Trade  0.153 0.487 0.495 
 
Customs Union Predictions: When the CU is in place, countries 1 and 2, eliminate tariffs on trade 
between them and impose a common external tariff on imports of Z from country 3 (ROW).  Country 3 
retaliates with its own tariffs on goods X and Y. We abstract from the determination of the common 
external tariff (CET) by keeping tariffs at the same level as in the tariff distorted experiment4. As noted 
earlier, the effect of CU membership is ambiguous because ex ante we do not know the balance of trade 
diversion and trade creation. Venables (2003) argues the outcome ‘depends on the comparative 
advantage of members relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world’. Specifically, the 
country with ‘extreme comparative advantage’ will generally be more vulnerable to trade diversion.  
 
The removal of import tariffs within the union increases trade among members, causes a reallocation of 
consumption and improves the terms of trade. The assumption of perfectly inelastic supply of exports 
implies production will not change. However, a CU will change the pattern of trade which determines the 
source of trade diversion. The product of wage rates and unit labour coefficient gives the cost of 
producing each good. When goods face a tariff, that rate is set at T. Following Venables (2003), country 1 
will now import any good from country 2 for which 
1
1
2
2 LJLLJL aPaP and 
M
jLJL PaP
2
2 where 
2
LJa denotes constant labour costs of producing a unit of j in country 2; 
1
LJa denotes constant labour costs 
of producing a unit of good j in country 1; 1LP and 2LP denote prices of labour in countries 1 and 2 
respectively and 
M
jP denotes the tariff distorted price of good j. We observe trade diversion if this 
particular good is now being imported from the trading partner rather than the least-cost producer and 
the “….extreme comparative advantage country will have a higher proportion of goods changing source of 
supply and, most of these changes are trade diversion” (Venables, 2003, pp. 754).   
 
Theoretical predictions are calculated as follows: aggregate demands of goods X and Y in the CU are 
derived from utility functions. Given production values and since quantities demanded of X and Y do not 
change in Country 3, we obtained CU consumption of X and Y as well as price from CU demand curves. 
Using new individual demand curves in each and tariff levels, individual quantity demanded are obtained. 
Country 1 (the extreme comparative advantage member) changes its source of supply of Z from 3 to 2 - 
trade diversion. Equilibrium trade diversion is calculated as: (PL2 a2LZ – PZ*) Zm where PL2 denotes price of 
labour in country 2, a2LZ labour requirement of Z in country 2, PZ* outside world price of Z and Zm denotes 
imports of Z by country 1. The theoretical derivations are computed in a similar way to the tariff distorted 
environment.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 This is consistent with the GATT-constrained CU. A GATT-constrained CU is a union that abides by Article 
XXIV of the GATT. Article XXIV of GATT (WTO) requires members of customs unions not to raise their 
external tariffs beyond pre-union.  
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Table 3: Customs Union Predictions   
Variables 
Customs Union ROW 
Country 1 Country 2 (Country 3) 
Production    
X 36 - - 
Y - 36 - 
Z - - 45 
Export    
X 18.66 - - 
Y - 20 - 
Z - - 18.66 
Prices    
X 160 - - 
Y - 300 - 
Z - - 220 
L 640 900 660 
Tariffs    
TCET 340 340 - 
TY - - 320 
TZ - - 240 
Terms of Trade 0.182 0.892 0.495 
Trade Diversion 2145.9 - - 
  
After formation of the CU; there are increases in net exports of X from country 1 to 2. Similarly net 
exports of Y from 2 to 1 rise. Lastly, net exports of goods X and Y vis-à-vis country 3 decreases; 
consumption of X in country 1(2) decreases (increases) whereas consumption of Y decreases (increases) 
in country 2 (1); there is a terms of trade; equilibrium trade diversion in our model is 2145.9 francs per 
period and 42918 francs for the whole experiment. Based on these predictions, the following hypotheses 
are tested:  
 
1: A CU increases trade flows within the union and decreases trade flows outside it.   
2: A CU decreases consumption of good X(Y) in country 1(2).. 
3: Following formation of the CU, consumption of good X and Y do not change.  
4: A CU increases the terms of trade of members.  
5: The extreme comparative advantage country loses from trade diversion. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
We are interested in convergence in the variables for both models. To account for within and across 
period changes, we apply a modified version of the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal model (first used in Riedl and 
Winden (2005)). 
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Ait is the variable of interest in period t for experiment i, i = 1….n. DiB are dummy variables that take a 
value of 1 for experiment i of the TD system, and 0 otherwise. DiC is a dummy variable representing 
experiment i of the CU system. DB is equal to 1 when the TD system is effective whereas DC=1 when the CU 
is in effect (and u is random error). Assume we are interested in the tariff distorted production of Y; when 
t = 1, production of Y in experiment i equals B1i, the coefficient of which can be interpreted as initial 
production of Y. However, its impact reduces over time, as 
t
1
tends to zero when t increases. Compared 
to B1i, when t increases the impact of B2 increases as 
t
t 1
gets larger. Thus, the coefficient B2 can be 
interpreted as the common asymptote of production of Y. Similarly, C1i denotes session specific starting 
value and C2 the asymptotic value of production of Y, for the CU system.    
 
To observe strong convergence of Ait, it suffices to test whether the estimates of B2 / C2 are significantly 
different from the predictions of the model. If not, the variable is strongly converging to the predicted 
values. However, as pointed by Noussair et al (1995), we can also observe weak or partial convergence. 
The former occurs if B2’s / C2’s are quantitatively closer to the predictions than B1i / B1i are. Since we are 
interested in the difference between the asymptotic value of the TD and CU systems, we used the Wald 
test to test whether the difference in B2 and C2 is equal to zero.  
 
4. Results and Discussion   
 
At the end of each experiment, a series of input and output prices are generated. These include ask, bid 
and contract prices. Figures 2- 5 present the contract output and input prices for Experiments 3 (tariff 
distorted) and 6 (CU). The x-axis denotes time measured in seconds. which gives the exact second of 
accepted bids or asks. The y-axis denotes prices (francs). The vertical lines parallel to the y-axis show the 
beginning and end of each period and the gap the time interval between periods. Nothing happens during 
this interval and subjects completed their record sheets. Although all observed contract prices do not 
automatically cluster towards the competitive equilibrium, there is some convergence in some markets. 
 
Figure 2: Output Price Time Series-TD Environment (Experiment 3) 
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Figure 3: Input Price Time Series- TD Environment (Experiment 3) 
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Figure 4: Output Price Time Series- CU Environment (Experiment 6) 
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Figure 5: Input Price Time Series- CU Environment (Experiment 6) 
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Customs Unions and Tariff- Distorted Environment: Table 4 compares production and trade in the 
two environments. Bold figures represent data for the good in which each country is specialised. 
Following creation of the CU, production of X in country 1 increases by 2.6 % and of Y by 6.7%, whilst 
production of Z decreases by 22.8%. Table 4 also reveals that intra- union export of X and Y rise by 
123.2% and 336.7% respectively with a decline in trade to and from country 3. Exports of Z to 1 and 2 
decline by 18.2 % and 307.2% respectively. Similarly, exports of X and Y from the CU vis-à-vis country 3 
decline by 70.9% and 28.6% respectively. 
 
Table 4:  TD Environment v/s CU Environment (All Experimental Sessions) 
Country 1 
Good 
Production Net Export  to Country 2 Net Export to Country 3 
TD CU TD CU TD CU 
X 384 394 82 183 55 16 
Y 29 30 5 12 13 10 
Z 33 32 6 16 16 8 
Country 2 
Good 
Production Net Export to Country 1 Net Export to Country 3 
TD CU TD CU TD CU 
X 28 23 4 2 11 6 
Y 315 336 30 131 35 25 
Z 216 220 30 94 90 8 
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Country 3 
Good 
Production Net Export to Country 1 Net Export to Country 2 
TD CU TD CU TD CU 
X 56 35 8 9 20 8 
Y 212 158 79 29 37 15 
Z 369 285 44 36 57 14 
 
Table 5 reports results for the convergence regressions of production in the three countries. Comparison 
of B2 and C2 indicates whether there are changes. The p-value tests the hypothesis that the asymptotic 
values of B2 and C2 are equal (two-sided Wald Test). If it is greater than 0.05, there is no evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis (production of X, Y and Z does not change with formation of the CU). Standard errors 
are given in italics (corrected for both session specific heteroskedasticity and serial correlation). As can 
be seen, there is no evidence of any changes in production in any countries. We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that production of X, Y and Z does not change following creation of the CU.  
 
Result 1: Customs Union formation increases trade flows within the union. Trade flows outside the 
CU tend not to change: Table 6 reports results for the convergence regressions, for net exports. Our 
theoretical predictions are that country 1’s net exports of X to country 2 increase following formation of 
the CU. Similarly, there is an increase in net exports of Y to country 1. However, net exports to the non- 
member country does not change, nor do net exports of Z. We compared B2 and C2 to check for changes. 
Compared to the tariff distorted system, we observe an increase in net exports of X to country 2 (from 
4.92 to 8.23 units). Similarly, net exports of Y to country 1 show a statistically significant better outcome 
under the CU (9.21 units) than the tariff distorted system (1.56 units). Thus, there is an increase in intra-
union net exports of goods X and Y following dismantling of tariffs between countries 1 and 2.   
 
The p-value indicates no change in net exports of goods X and Y to country 3. These are 1.58 units for the 
CU compared to 2.94 units and 1.88 units compared to 1.94 units for X and Y respectively. Also net 
exports of Z tend not to change. The null hypothesis that there is no change in net exports of Z after 
creation of the CU is rejected. Thus, we conclude that net exports of good X and Y from the CU are the 
same as under the tariff distorted environment and net exports of good Z from ROW to CU remain 
constant when the CU is established. This finding is consistent with the general perception that creation 
of trading blocks always increase trade withinh the block.        
  
 Result 2: Customs Union formation increases consumption of good X(Y) in country1/(2): Following 
establishment of the CU, there is a consumption gain in X of 53.9 % in country 2 and of Y by 73.0 % in 
country 1.  Comparing B2 to C2 in country 1 in Table 7 reveals a decrease in consumption of X (at the 10% 
level of significance); an increase in consumption of Y (from 4.73 units to 11.12 units); and an increase in 
consumption of Z. In country 2 we observe:  an increase in consumption of X (from 6.38 units to 9.35 
units); although in absolute terms C2 is less than B2, we fail to reject the null that consumption levels of Y 
and Z do not change with the CU. In country 3, all our theoretical predictions are satisfied as consumption 
of X, Y and Z do not change after the CU is formed. We made nine predictions about consumption levels 
and seven are observed. Following establishment of the CU, we observed an increase in consumption of X 
in country 2 and an increase in consumption of Y in country 1.  
 
Result 3: CU formation improves the terms of trade of member countries relative to non-member 
countries: We compute a weighted average terms of trade for the three countries. Our prediction is an 
improved terms of trade for members.  Table 8 reports regression results.   B2 is 40.36 and C2 is 73.21 for 
country 1 and B2 is 41.01 and C2 is 128.94 for country 2. There is a general deterioration in the terms of 
trade for country 3. B2 is 53.61 and C2 is 24.78 for country 3. Hence, our data supports toward improved 
terms of trade for members and a deterioration for non-members.     
 
Result 4: The extreme comparative advantage country loses due to diversion: Equilibrium trade 
diversion is calculated as: (PL2 a2LZ – PZ*) Zm where PL2 denotes price of labour in country 2, a2LZ denotes 
labour requirement of Z in country 2, PZ* denotes outside world price of Z and Zm denotes import of Z by 
country 1. Equilibrium trade diversion in our model is 2145.9 francs per period and 42918 francs for the 
whole experiment. Total trade diverted over the course of all experiments is 29420 francs compared to 
the benchmark of 42918 francs, i.e. 68.5 %.  The pooled trade diversion observed in each period is given 
in Figure 6.  
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Table 5: Convergence Regressions for Production: TD environment vs. CU environment               
Y = B11 DB1 1/t + ......................B15 DB5 1/t + B2 DB (t-1)/t + CC1 DC1 1/t + ......................CC5 D5 1/t + B2 DC (t-1)/t +  u 
Variable  B11  B12   B13  B14     C11  C12   C13  C14     B2 C2 p-value  R2 
  Country 1      
Production of X  7.34 4.29 28.48 26.74 20.69 10.45 19.47 33.87 21.28 18.51 0.5353 0.91 
  5.85 3.6 4.34 3.5 3.9 9.44 2.36 5.47 2.53 3.62     
Production of Y  3.08 2.3 1.76 0.34 1.21 1.66 1.36 0.88 1.15 1.68 0.4404 0.72 
  1.21 0.52 1.23 0.63 0.56 0.36 0.78 0.42 0.28 0.37     
Production of Z  4.08 5.35 -0.38 0.7 1.62 1.76 2.27 0.53 0.98 1.58 0.2746 0.83 
  1.16 0.51 0.42 1.02 0.77 0.84 0.63 0.45 0.39 0.36     
  Country 2     
Production of X  0.46 0.25 0.1 1.95 2.13 2.89 -0.2 -0.55 1.99 1.22 0.4142 0.57 
  0.69 0.79 0.63 1.98 0.29 0.54 0.38 0.55 0.85 0.38     
Production of Y  6.72 15.26 26.6 17.04 9.71 8.21 15.39 17.88 15.19 20.16 0.1359 0.92 
  2.55 2.04 4 5.41 5.34 2.33 1.9 1.16 2.66 1.84     
Production of Z  18.54 15.81 3.08 8.07 9.24 7.53 12.5 8.21 10.31 12.36 0.4476 0.88 
  1.27 4.65 2.49 1.55 1.96 2.02 2.41 2.08 2.05 1.7     
  Country 3    
Production of X  2.27 6.04 2.46 3.16 2.18 0.56 1.2 1.95 2.22 1.98 0.7919 0.75 
  1.22 2.86 0.7 1.73 0.46 0.68 0.38 0.5 0.8 0.4     
Production of Y  8.47 9.16 11.87 8.61 5.72 -0.77 14.29 8.14 11.49 8.63 0.1733 0.91 
  2.67 2.96 1.91 1.58 2.24 2.14 2.51 2.21 1.13 1.71     
Production of Z  16.21 13.41 22.12 20.62 7.07 5.5 8.74 19.33 18.75 17.68 0.7343 0.93 
  6 4.38 2.07 5.61 2.49 5.99 2.88 3.26 1.99 2.4     
 
Table 6: Convergence Regressions for Net Exports: TD environment vs. CU environment 
Ait = B11 DB1 1/t + ......................B15 DB5 1/t + B2 DB (t-1)/t + CC1 DC1 1/t + ......................CC5 D5 1/t + C2 DC (t-1)/t +  u 
Variable  B11  B12   B13  B14     C11  C12   C13  C14     B2 C2 p-value  R2  
  Country 1      
Net Export X to Country 2 4.89 2.1 4.48 1.04 8.91 7.29 8.67 16.05 4.92 8.23 0.050 0.86 
  1.54 1.2 0.87 1.23 1.52 3.08 1.24 1.23 0.97 1.34     
Net Export X to Country 3 1.42 0.79 4.58 3.26 -0.66 -0.54 0.55 0.1 2.94 1.58 0.2267 0.65 
  2.43 0.54 1.67 1.26 0.711 0.66 1.05 0.69 0.86 0.68     
  Country 2      
Net Export Y to Country 1 0.65 4 0.06 1.1 2.51 2.1 3.67 5.24 1.56 9.21 0.000 0.85 
  0.46 0.39 0.99 1.04 1.97 1.42 1.61 1.5 0.37 1.45     
Net Export Y to Country 3 0.82 3.12 0.52 1.72 0.11 0.04 1.53 0.31 1.92 1.88 0.9735 0.54 
  1.15 1.13 0.49 0.7 1.02 1.07 1.87 0.91 0.42 0.94     
  Country 3     
Net Export Z to Country 1 -0.7 1.8 2.28 1.98 -0.29 1.06 3.56 2.16 2.92 1.94 0.2711 0.75 
  0.75 1.25 1.24 1.09 0.52 1.07 0.65 1.08 0.7 0.52     
Net Export Z to Country 2 1.91 -0.53 3.57 2.02 1.02 -0.48 -0.07 0.43 2.78 1.09 0.115 0.72 
  1.04 0.69 0.61 1.25 1 0.56 0.44 0.86 0.84 0.62     
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Table 7: Convergence Regressions for Consumption: TD environment vs. CU environment                               
Ait = B11 DB1 1/t + ......................B15 DB5 1/t + B2 DB (t-1)/t + CC1 DC1 1/t + ......................CC5 D5 1/t + B2 DC (t-1)/t +  u 
Variable  B11  B12   B13  B14     C11  C12   C13  C14     B2 C2 p-value  R2  
  Country 1      
Consumption of X  3.79 2.76 11.79 14.23 12.07 1.06 6.65 14.82 11.56 7.45 0.091 0.89 
  1.67 1.71 2.02 1.23 2.42 3.76 1.7 2.67 1.68 1.73     
Consumption of Y 0.36 5.67 2.22 2.95 2 2.44 7.37 7.93 4.73 11.12 0.000 0.91 
  0.72 1.47 0.51 1.91 2.16 1.22 1.52 0.75 0.69 1.28     
Consumption of Z 5.61 2.29 1.94 2.89 3.72 4.33 8.69 4.33 5.05 8.08 0.040 0.89 
  1.3 1.08 1.25 1.22 1.06 0.911 1.12 1.22 1.06 0.93     
  Country 2      
Consumption of X  5.7 2.7 4.45 3.59 8.63 7.55 9.14 15.56 6.38 9.35 0.050 0.88 
  1.64 0.42 0.87 1.59 1.71 3.01 1.33 1.38 0.91 1.32     
Consumption of Y 3.84 2.37 21.33 14 5.64 2.16 5.23 7.81 11.51 10.24 0.600 0.87 
  3.05 2.91 5.27 6.1 2.26 1.35 1.07 1.22 2.13 1.05     
Consumption of Z 10.79 -0.83 3.78 6.31 6.38 1.69 6.74 3.93 8.85 8.02 0.693 0.85 
  2.36 1.65 1.68 1.93 1.69 0.96 1.9 0.87 1.69 1.21     
  Country 3     
Consumption of X  4.18 0.77 5.13 5.48 2.04 -0.26 1.23 1.12 4.64 2.99 0.118 0.85 
  1.83 0.53 1.25 0.71 0.94 0.46 1.04 0.73 0.76 0.68     
Consumption of Y 3.66 12.94 2.86 3.68 6.88 0.82 7.88 5.7 7.46 8.13 0.714 0.87 
  1.45 1.13 0.75 1.62 2.07 2.17 2.89 2.74 1.14 1.42     
Consumption of Z 5.62 28.19 10.4 18.64 7.59 2.51 4.21 14.56 13.94 13.43 0.891 0.86 
  2.48 5.99 2.29 5.11 1.14 3.26 3.27 1.39 3.12 1.84     
                                     
Table 8: Convergence Regressions for Terms of Trade: TD environment vs. CU environment     
Ait = B11 DB1 1/t + ......................B15 DB5 1/t + B2 DB (t-1)/t + CC1 DC1 1/t + ......................CC5 D5 1/t + B2 DC (t-1)/t +  u 
Variable  B11  B12   B13  B14     C11  C12   C13  C14     B2 C2 p-value  R2 
TOT1 32.03 59.73 33.49 16.62 70.95 59.95 79.94 73.49 40.36 73.22 0.000 0.96 
  12.07 12.75 5.78 4.47 7.12 11.7 6.89 4.16 4.71 6.04     
TOT2 59.04 38.23 42.83 50.49 55.94 119.89 140.58 151.92 41.01 128.997 0.000 0.94 
  5.77 8.71 9.62 5.39 23.63 26.46 14.82 20.43 6.53 14.87     
TOT3 139.41 151.66 70.49 75.7 79.77 42.91 23.65 10.34 53.61 24.79 0.020 0.88 
  9.24 48.33 7.33 6.56 15.17 7.3 4.87 4.37 10.27 6.51     
  
Figure 6: Trade Diversion 
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        We apply the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal model check for convergence in trade diversion.  
  
Table 9: Convergence Regression for Trade Diversion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 suggests strong convergence. We fail to reject the null that the asymptote of our regression is 
similar to the equilibrium predicted trade diversion. Statistically, we show that the extreme comparative 
advantage country experiences trade diversion losses, consistent with Venables’ (2003) theoretical 
model.  
 
5. Conclusion   
 
In this experiment a laboratory setting is constructed to induce a tariff distorted and CU trading 
environments within the 3 x 3 CRM . In the former, tariffs are imposed on goods in which each country 
specializes; in the CU, internal tariffs are eliminated between members and a common external tariff set 
on external imports. We use a convergence regression to compare the two environments and test several 
hypotheses. We found that a CU increases trade flows within the union and reduces trade flows outside it, 
increases member countries consumption of some goods and improves members’ terms of trade. There is 
also trade diversion which is a loss to the extreme comparative advantage country. As far as we are aware 
this is the first test of core CU propositions using laboratory generated experimental data. Our results 
support both the theoretical argument and practical observation that creation of customs union tend to 
induce trade among members.  
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APPENDIX 1 
REDEMPTION VALUES  
Consumer 1 Unit  X Unit X Total  Y Unit Y Total  Z Unit Z Total  
  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  
 1 600 600 640 640 680 680 
 2 510 1110 550 1190 590 1270 
 3 420 1530 460 1650 500 1770 
 4 330 1860 370 2020 410 2180 
 5 240 2100 280 2300 320 2500 
 6 150 2250 190 2490 230 2730 
 7 60 2310 100 2590 140 2870 
 8 10 2320 10 2600 50 2920 
Consumer 2 Unit  X Unit X Total  Y Unit Y Total  Z Unit Z Total  
   Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  
 1 555 555 595 595 635 635 
 2 465 1020 505 1100 545 1180 
 3 375 1395 415 1515 455 1635 
 4 285 1680 325 1840 365 2000 
 5 495 2175 235 2075 275 2275 
 6 105 2280 145 2220 185 2460 
 7 15 2295 55 2275 95 2555 
 8 5 2300 20 2295 50 2605 
Consumer 3 Unit  X Unit X Total  Y Unit Y Total  Z Unit Z Total  
   Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  
 1 510 510 550 550 590 590 
 2 420 930 460 1010 500 1090 
 3 330 1260 370 1380 410 1500 
 4 240 1500 280 1660 320 1820 
 5 450 1950 190 1850 230 2050 
 6 60 2010 100 1950 140 2190 
 7 15 2025 10 1960 50 2240 
 8 5 2030 5 1965 10 2250 
 
APPENDIX 2  
 
Instructions Type C -Tariff Distorted Environment: You are participating in an experiment of market 
decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them you can earn considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash. In this experiment, we are conducting a market in which you will 
be designated as one of two types of traders: Type C or Type P. The experiment will run for 5 periods of 
10 minutes each. You can find your type at the top of the instructions.  
 
You are classified as Type C and you are given a Record Sheet for each period of the experiment and a 
Redemption value sheet (these are on your desk). 
 
The Redemption Value Sheet will help you determine the value to you of any decision that you might 
make. This information is private to you and should not be revealed to anyone.  
 
There are 4 types of goods (one input and three outputs) which can be traded in these markets: W, X, Y 
and Z. You can make profits in two ways: through consumption and trading of the goods. Unlike the 
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practice session (practice 2) where you were allowed to buy and sell in the same market, here in each 
market you can either buy or sell but not both. When you move the order box between market you will 
see either F1-BUY if you are a buyer or F2-SELL if you are a seller.  
 
Trading in all markets is in terms of francs; however your final payoff will be in terms of pounds. Your 
conversion rate is 3000 francs to £1 (for every 3000 francs profits you make, you earn £1). You will be 
paid at the end of the experiment according to how much profit you make. In this handout it is explained 
how to calculate profits.      
   
ENDOWMENTS: At the beginning of each period, you will be given an endowment of W. This is the same 
for each period. You are free to sell any part of this endowment to anyone who might want to buy it.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 100000 francs cash on hand.    
 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS: Type C traders are endowed with W but would like to consume X, Y and Z. 
They can sell W to Type P to increase their cash in order to buy X, Y and Z. Thus, Type C is a seller in 
market for W and buyer in market for X, Y and Z.   
 
Type P traders are also endowed with W, but they may purchase units of W from Type C traders in order 
to produce. They can produce X, Y, Z from W and sell them to Type C traders to increase their cash on 
hand. Thus, Type P is a buyer in market for W and seller in market for X, Y and Z.  
 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO TYPE C  
 
CONSUMPTION: During the experiment you are free to sell as many units as you wish of W and buy as 
many units of X, Y and Z as you wish. Each unit of X, Y and Z you buy is assumed to be consumed by you.  
 
Your Redemption Value sheet determines the amount you receive through consumption. You have 
already been instructed in how to read the redemption value sheet in the practice session. For the first 
unit of X that you consume for a given  trading period, you receive the amount listed on your Redemption 
Value Sheet – the first row in the X unit value column (500, for example). For the second unit of X that you 
consume, you receive the amount listed in second row of the X unit value column (480 for example). The 
total amount that you receive from the consumption of both is found in the second column of X total value 
column (500 + 480 = 980). The amount you receive from consumption of Y and Z are found in a similar 
way by reading the final 4 columns. The redemption value you received from W is always zero.   
 
Whenever you trade you should take account of those redemption values. Your per unit profit is given by: 
(redemption value- purchase price).    
 
Note: You are not allowed to produce: DO NOT HIT F4 AT ANYTIME. 
 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET- in francs (for Consumption Decisions) 
 
      Unit  X unit   X total   Y unit  Y total   Z Unit   Z total   
 
     Value    Value     Value   Value   Value    Value 
 
         1      500      500 
 
  2      480     980       
 
      3 
 
      4 
 
      5 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH TYPES 
 
TRADING PROFITS: You can earn profits through consumption and trading.  Selling increases your cash 
on hand by the amount of total sales revenue. Buying decreases your cash in hand by the value of 
purchases.  
 
EARNINGS: Your profits per period exactly is equal to 
 
(Cash in hand at the end of the period) – (Cash in hand at the beginning of the period) + (Redemption 
value of units that you consume). 
  
At the end of each period you must complete a record sheet.  
 
Record Sheet 
Period No:  
Trading  
 
(1) Cash on hand at end of the period 
 
(2) Cash on hand at beginning of period 
 
(3) Net Change in cash on hand (1) – (2)  
 
Consumption 
   
 (4) Units Consumed: X             + Y              + Z                                   
 
Earnings from consumption 
 
(5)    X 
 
(6)    Y 
 
(7)    Z 
 
(8)   Total Earnings from consumption 
             (5) + (6) + (7)  
 
 (10) TOTAL PROFITS FOR THE PERIOD: (3) + (8) 
 
Your record sheet is divided into two sections: Trading and Consumption. In line (1) fill the cash on hand 
at the end of the period. In line (2) fill the cash on hand at the beginning of the period. Line (3) is simply 
line (1) minus line (2). In line (4) enter the number of units that you consume of W, X, Y and Z. In line (5) - 
(7), fill in the earnings from the consumption X, Y and Z and Y based on your redemption values sheet.   In 
line (8) add the total of lines (5), (6) and (7). In line (9) add the total of line (3) and (8), this is your profit 
for the period (in francs). You should aim to maximise your profits since this value will determines your 
earnings at the end of the experiment.   
 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade in MARKET 10 and MARKET 12 
 
You will be taxed for trading in market 1 and market 9. For each unit you buy in market 1, you pay a tax of 
160 francs. For each unit you buy in market 9, you pay a tax of 170 francs. The taxes remain the same for 
the entire experiment.  
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APPENDIX 3 
Instructions Type C- Customs Union Environment  
  
You are participating in an experiment of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you 
follow them you can earn considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In this 
experiment, we are conducting a market in which you will be designated as one of two types of traders: 
Type C or Type P. The experiment will run for 5 periods of 10 minutes each. You can find your type at the 
top of the instructions.  
 
You are classified as Type C and you are given a Record Sheet for each period of the experiment and a 
Redemption value sheet (these are on your desk). 
 
The Redemption Value Sheet will help you determine the value to you of any decision that you might 
make. This information is private to you and should not be revealed to anyone.  
 
There are 4 types of goods (one input and three outputs) which can be traded in these markets: W, X, Y 
and Z. You can make profits in two ways: through consumption and trading of the goods. Unlike the 
practice session (practice 2) where you were allowed to buy and sell in the same market, here in each 
market you can either buy or sell but not both. When you move the order box between market you will 
see either F1-BUY if you are a buyer or F2-SELL if you are a seller.  
 
Trading in all markets is in terms of francs; however your final payoff will be in terms of pounds. Your 
conversion rate is 3000 francs to £1 (for every 3000 francs profits you make, you earn £1). You will be 
paid at the end of the experiment according to how much profit you make. In this handout it is explained 
how to calculate profits.      
   
ENDOWMENTS 
 
At the beginning of each period, you will be given an endowment of W. This is the same for each period. 
You are free to sell any part of this endowment to anyone who might want to buy it.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 100000 francs cash on hand.    
 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 
 
Type C traders are endowed with W but would like to consume X, Y and Z. They can sell W to Type P to 
increase their cash in order to buy X, Y and Z. Thus, Type C is a seller in market for W and buyer in market 
for X, Y and Z.   
 
Type P traders are also endowed with W, but they may purchase units of W from Type C traders in order 
to produce. They can produce X, Y, Z from W and sell them to Type C traders to increase their cash on 
hand. Thus, Type P is a buyer in market for W and seller in market for X, Y and Z.  
 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO TYPE C  
 
CONSUMPTION: During the experiment you are free to sell as many units as you wish of W and buy as 
many units of X, Y and Z as you wish. Each unit of X, Y and Z you buy is assumed to be consumed by you.  
 
Your Redemption Value sheet determines the amount you receive through consumption. You have 
already been instructed in how to read the redemption value sheet in the practice session. For the first 
unit of X that you consume for a given  trading period, you receive the amount listed on your Redemption 
Value Sheet – the first row in the X unit value column (500, for example). For the second unit of X that you 
consume, you receive the amount listed in second row of the X unit value column (480 for example). The 
total amount that you receive from the consumption of both is found in the second column of X total value 
column (500 + 480 = 980). The amount you receive from consumption of Y and Z are found in a similar 
way by reading the final 4 columns. The redemption value you received from W is always zero.   
 
Whenever you trade you should take account of those redemption values. Your per unit profit is given by: 
(redemption value- purchase price).    
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REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET- in francs (for Consumption Decisions) 
 
      Unit  X unit   X total   Y unit  Y total   Z Unit   Z total   
 
     Value    Value     Value   Value   Value    Value 
 
         1      500       500 
 
  2      480       980       
 
      3 
 
      4 
 
      5 
 
 
 
 
Note: You are not allowed to produce: DO NOT HIT F4 AT ANYTIME. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH TYPES  
 
TRADING PROFITS: You can earn profits through consumption and trading.  Selling increases your cash 
on hand by the amount of total sales revenue. Buying decreases your cash in hand by the value of 
purchases.  
 
EARNINGS 
Your profits per period exactly is equal to 
 
(Cash in hand at the end of the period) – (Cash in hand at the beginning of the period) + (Redemption 
value of units that you consume). At the end of each period you must complete a record sheet.  
 
Record Sheet 
Period No:  
Trading  
 
(1) Cash on hand at end of the period 
 
(2) Cash on hand at beginning of period 
 
(3) Net Change in cash on hand (1) – (2)  
 
Consumption 
   
 (4) Units Consumed: X               + Y                  + Z                                   
 
Earnings from consumption 
 
(5)    X 
 
(6)    Y 
 
(7)    Z 
 
(8)   Total Earnings from consumption 
             (5) + (6) + (7)  
 
 
 (10) TOTAL PROFITS FOR THE PERIOD: (3) + (8) 
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Your record sheet is divided into two sections: Trading and Consumption. In line (1) fill the cash on hand 
at the end of the period. In line (2) fill the cash on hand at the beginning of the period. Line (3) is simply 
line (1) minus line (2). In line (4) enter the number of units that you consume of W, X, Y and Z. In line (5) - 
(7), fill in the earnings from the consumption X, Y and Z and Y based on your redemption values sheet.   In 
line (8) add the total of lines (5), (6) and (7). In line (9) add the total of line (3) and (8), this is your profit 
for the period (in francs). You should aim to maximise your profits since this value will determines your 
earnings at the end of the experiment.   
 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade in MARKET 10 and MARKET 12 
 
You will be taxed for trading market 9. For each unit you buy in market 9, you pay a tax of 170 francs. The 
taxes remain the same for the entire experiment.  
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX  
 
Tariff Distorted Predictions  
 
Differentiating the utility function:  
 
U (X, Y, Z) = 600X- 45 X2 + 720Y- 45Y2 + 840Z- 45Z2 + m                                        (1) 
 
gives the marginal utilities of each good, i.e. 
Z
Z
U
MU
Y
Y
U
MU
X
X
U
MU
Z
Y
X
90840
90720
90600
                                                                                            (2) 
Given there are 3 consumers in country i, free trade aggregate demand in each country is given by:  
 
ZPZAD
YPYAD
XPXAD
Z
i
Y
i
X
i
30840)(
30720)(
30600)(
*
*
*
                                         (3) 
 where i = 1, 2,3                                                                                                             
 
Since, there are 9 consumers in the whole system, total aggregate demand is given by:  
 
ZPZAD
YPYAD
XPXAD
Z
Y
X
10840)(
10720)(
10600)(
*
*
*
                        (4) 
      
Production 
X = 4 (9) = 36 
Y= 3 (12) = 36 
Z = 3 (15) = 45  
 
Since total production = total consumption; replacing production levels in equation (4) yields free trade 
prices, such that P*X  = 240; P*Y =360 and P*Z  = 390.  
 
The introduction of the tariff causes a divergence in consumption level between the importing and 
exporting country.  
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Country 1   
The introduction of Tij (i= X, Y and Z; j=1, 2, 3) increases the consumption of good X and decreases 
consumption of Good Y and Z. New demand functions in each country can be written as:  
 
P*X – ½ (TX2 + Tx3) = 600 -30X 
P*Y + TY1 /2 = 720 -30Y  
P*Z +TZ1 /2 = 840 -30Z                                                                                                 (5) 
 
As countries maximizes the same utility function, this implies that, i.e. Ti j = Ti . Substituting free trade 
prices, gives quantity demanded:   
 
     X = 12 + TX  /30  
     Y = 12 - TY  /60  
     Z = 15 - TZ  /60                                                                                                        (6) 
  
We can write preferences as a function of Ti 
 
U1 = 5355 – 16TX -0.05T2X + 6TY -0.0125T2Y +8.5TZ -0.0125T2Z   
    = UF- 16TX -0.05T2X + 6TY -0.0125T2Y +8.5TZ -0.0125T2Z                                       (7) 
 
where UF denotes free trade utility level.  
 
Country 2   
The introduction of Ti (i= X, Y and Z) increases the consumption of good Y and decreases the consumption 
of Good X and Z. New demand functions are now:  
 
P*X +TX2 /2 = 600 -30X 
P*Y – ½ (TY1+ TY3) = 720 -30Y 
P*Z +TZ2 /2 = 840 -30Z                                                                                                  (8) 
 
Substituting the free trade prices, P*X  = 360; P*Y =240 and P*Z  = 390 gives quantity demanded: 
 
     X = 12 - TX /60  
     Y = 12 + TY /30  
     Z = 15 - TZ /60                                                                                                         (9) 
  
We can write preferences as a function of Ti, i.e. 
 
U2 = 5355 + 8TX -0.0125T2X - 12TY -0.05T2Y +8.5TZ -0.0125T2Z   
     = UF + 8TX -0.0125T2X - 12TY -0.05T2Y +8.5TZ -0.0125T2Z                                   (10) 
Country 3   
The introduction of Ti (i= X, Y and Z) increases the consumption of good Z and decreases the consumption 
of Good X and Y. New demand functions are now:  
 
P*X +TX3 /2 = 600 -30X 
P*Y +TY3 /2 = 720 -30Y 
P*Z – ½ (TZ1 + TZ3 ) = 840 -30Z                                                                                   (11) 
 
Substituting the free trade prices, P*X  = 360; P*Y =240 and P*Z  = 390 gives quantity demanded:      
     X = 12 - TX /60  
     Y = 12 - TY /60  
     Z = 15 + TZ /30                                                                                                      (12) 
  
We can write preferences as a function of Ti, i.e. 
 
U3 = 5355 + 8TX -0.0125T2X +6TY -0.0125T2Y -17TZ -0.05T2Z   
    = UF + 8TX -0.0125T2X +6TY -0.0125T2Y -17TZ -0.05T2Z                                        (13) 
 
Differentiating equation (7), (10) and (13) gives the tariff level on each good:   
 
  72 
dU1/dTY =  dU3/dTY = 0   TY =240 
dU1/dTZ = dU2/dTZ = 0   TZ =340 
dU2/dTX = dU3/dTX = 0   TX =320 
 
Therefore, TX =320; TY =240 and TZ =340 
 
Substituting these tariff level in equation (6), (9) and (12) gives the quantity demanded of X, Y and Z in 
each country after the introduction of the tariffs. Both demands and tariffs are substituted in equations 
(5), (8) and (11) to calculate the tariff distorted prices. The relationship whereby input prices equal their 
marginal revenue product still holds.  We also compute a weighted average terms of trade for each 
country.   
 
Customs Union Predictions  
 
Following the creation of the customs union between country 1 and country 2, tariffs are eliminated on 
internal trade and imports of Z from country 3 are taxed at the same rate as in the TD environment.   
 
Given there are 6 consumers in the customs union, aggregate demand of X and Y in the customs union is:  
 
YPYAD
XPXAD
CU
Y
CU
CU
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CU
15720)(
15600)(
                                                                                (14) 
Quantity demanded in country 3 is the same as the tariff distorted situation, i.e. 6.66 units, 8 units and 
26.33 units of good X, Y and Z respectively.  
  
Since production of X and Y are 36 and 36 units respectively, CU consumption of X and Y are 29.333 units 
and 28 units respectively which can be substituted in equation 14 to give PXCU = 160;   PYCU = 300. 
 
Country 1    
Following the creation of the customs union, new demand curves are     
P*X – ½ Tx3 = 600 -30X  
P*Y  = 720 -30Y 
P*Z + ½ TZ1 = 840 -30Z                                                                                              (15) 
 
New quantities demanded are:   
     X = 12 + T3X  /60  
     Y = 12   
     Z = 15 - TZ  /60                                                                                                      (16) 
 
At T3X  = 320 and TCET =340; new quantity demanded of X, Y and Z are 17.33, 12, 9.33 units.   
  
Country 2   
New demand functions are now:  
P*X  = 600 -30X 
P*Y – ½TY3 = 720 -30Y 
P*Z +½ TZ2 = 840 -30Z                                                                                                (17) 
 
New quantities demanded are:   
X = 12   
Y = 12 + T3Y /60 
Z = 15 - TZ /60                                                                                                            (18) 
  
At T2Y  = 240 and TCET =340; new quantity demanded of X, Y and Z are 12, 16, 9.33 units.   
 
Trade Diversion  
 
Following the creation of the CU, country 1 buys good Z from country 2 rather than country 3.  This is 
trade diversion and country 1 pays an additional costs of (PL2 a2LZ – PZ*) Zm. The equilibrium trade 
diversion in our model is 2145.9 francs per period and 42918 francs for the whole experiment.    
